Why did Ireland vote twice on the Nice and Lisbon treaties?

Irish constitutional law required popular approval for the Nice and Lisbon treaties, but it did not automatically require second votes. After voters rejected Nice in 2001 and Lisbon in 2008, Irish political leaders—with support from European leaders—organized repeated referendums to continue pursuing treaty ratification.

TL;DR: Irish law required a referendum on each treaty; political decisions produced the reruns after the first ballots failed.

What does the paper argue about the EU’s democratic deficit?

Ireland’s repeated Nice and Lisbon referendums show how a democratic deficit can persist even when citizens vote directly. The paper’s central distinction is between allowing a ballot and allowing meaningful policy contestation: a second vote is not fully democratic if the acceptable choice is effectively narrowed to ratifying the policy already preferred by political leaders.

What does “democratic deficit” mean in this paper?

The paper defines a democratic deficit as a condition in which citizens lack a meaningful ability to contest political leadership, influence the direction of policy, or choose among alternative policy options. Under this definition, holding a vote is not sufficient if political actors constrain the alternatives that voters can effectively pursue.

How can referendums coexist with an EU democratic deficit?

The paper identifies five features that limited Irish voters’ ability to contest the direction of EU policy. The first three concern how leaders framed and organized the second votes; the final two concern citizen engagement and the selective repetition of referendum outcomes.

1. Initial rejections were reframed as voter incomprehension. Some Irish and European leaders treated the first “no” votes as failures of understanding rather than as expressions of political argument or preference.
2. Second referendums pursued treaty ratification. Political leaders organized repeat votes after the Nice and Lisbon defeats instead of treating the initial outcomes as final.
3. Warnings about another “no” narrowed the perceived choice. Leaders emphasized severe political and economic consequences to mobilize “yes” voters and isolate opponents.
4. Low public knowledge reflected weak citizen engagement. Limited understanding of the treaties also indicated that EU institutions had not successfully involved citizens in meaningful policy debate.
5. Only rejected outcomes were repeated. In the cases surveyed through 2014, EU treaty referendums had been repeated after “no” votes, not after “yes” votes, suggesting that second ballots were used to sanction established policy rather than shape it.

Voter incomprehension rhetoric

Some political leaders explained the first defeats as failures of voter understanding rather than as expressions of political preference. The paper argues that this framing delegitimized the “no” outcomes and implied that properly informed citizens would support ratification.

Second votes aimed at treaty ratification

The repeated ballots did not begin an open choice among new policy paths; they gave leaders another opportunity to secure approval for the treaties. This asymmetry—repeating failed votes but not successful ones—is central to the paper’s account of constrained contestation.

Warnings about the consequences of another “no”

Irish and European leaders warned that another rejection could damage Ireland’s economy, influence, reputation, or relationship with Europe. The paper does not establish the causal effect or accuracy of these warnings; it argues that their strategic use made rejection appear politically indefensible.

What happened in Ireland’s repeated Nice and Lisbon referendums?

Irish voters rejected both treaties on the first ballot and approved both on the second. The comparison matters because the Nice reversal was driven largely by higher turnout, whereas the smaller turnout change for Lisbon indicates that more initial “no” voters likely switched sides.

Why did Ireland vote twice on the Treaty of Nice?

Ireland voted twice because the first Nice referendum failed and Irish leaders then organized another vote to obtain ratification. The paper argues that leaders depicted the 2001 defeat as a product of weak public understanding, emphasized the risks of a second rejection, and mobilized citizens who had not participated in the first ballot.

The first vote failed with just 34.8% turnout. In 2002, turnout increased to 49.5% and the treaty passed with 62.9% support. Because the treaty itself was not renegotiated, the case differs from Denmark’s repeated Maastricht referendum, where four opt-outs were negotiated before voters returned to the polls.

Why did Ireland vote twice on the Treaty of Lisbon?

Ireland’s first Lisbon referendum failed in 2008, after which leaders planned a second vote and again stressed voter incomprehension and the costs of rejection. Before the 2009 referendum, policy guarantees addressed Irish concerns about taxation and military neutrality, but the Lisbon Treaty text itself did not change.

The voting dynamics differed from Nice. Turnout increased by only about six percentage points, while support moved from a 53.4% “no” majority to a 67.1% “yes” majority. The paper therefore interprets the Lisbon reversal as involving substantial vote switching, not only the mobilization of prior nonvoters.

Did the European Union force Ireland to vote again?

No. Irish constitutional law, rather than EU law, required referendums for treaties that extended beyond existing agreements. The repeat ballots were organized by Irish political leaders, although EU officials strongly favored ratification and participated in the broader response to the initial defeats.

The paper’s claim is therefore more precise than “the EU forced a second vote.” It argues that Irish and European leaders’ framing of the defeats—and the broader pattern of repeating rejected but not approved EU treaty referendums—revealed a political culture in which electoral mechanisms could constrain rather than expand policy contestation.

Are repeated referendums inherently undemocratic?

No. The paper explicitly argues that a second referendum can be democratically defensible. The key question is whether repetition responds to a principled rule or material change, rather than serving as a tactical device available only when voters reject the government’s preferred outcome.

When can a repeated referendum be legitimate?

• When law or constitutional convention requires multiple votes for a major policy change.
• When material new facts emerge after the first referendum.
• When an independent, politically diverse body oversees the conditions for repetition.
• When the same rule for repetition applies to both “yes” and “no” outcomes.

How does the paper study Ireland’s repeated EU referendums?

The article uses comparative qualitative case studies and discourse analysis. It examines how leaders understood, planned, and publicly framed Ireland’s Nice and Lisbon revotes, rather than attempting to estimate a single causal effect on individual vote choice.

Primary cases

Ireland’s 2001 and 2002 Nice referendums and its 2008 and 2009 Lisbon referendums.

Evidence

Political speeches, interviews, memoranda, official reports, campaign materials, and post-referendum surveys.

Comparative checks

Denmark’s Maastricht votes, the 2005 French and Dutch votes on the European Constitution, other EU electoral institutions, alternative explanations, and socioeconomic developments through 2014.

Analytical focus

How electoral procedures can preserve or constrain meaningful contestation over the direction of public policy.

Why does this research matter for direct democracy?

The paper shifts attention from whether citizens are allowed to vote to whether they can meaningfully influence the available policy path. This distinction matters for referendums, plebiscites, and other forms of direct democracy: electoral participation alone does not guarantee genuine choice if officials can selectively repeat results, define dissent as ignorance, or make only one outcome appear politically viable.

The article therefore offers a practical test for democratic legitimacy: Can citizens use the vote to pursue a real policy alternative, or can they only approve a policy already selected by governing elites?

Watch a video overview of the paper

This short paper page is complemented by a video introduction to the argument, the Irish Nice and Lisbon cases, and their implications for the EU’s democratic deficit.

What is the paper’s published abstract?

The published abstract states the research question, the comparison of the Nice and Lisbon referendums, and the three leadership strategies examined in depth.

Frequently asked questions about Ireland’s repeated EU referendums

What does democratic deficit mean in this paper?

In this paper, a democratic deficit exists when citizens lack a meaningful ability to contest political leadership or the direction of policy. The key test is substantive influence over policy alternatives, not simply the presence of an election or referendum.

Why did Ireland hold second referendums on the Nice and Lisbon treaties?

Irish voters initially rejected both treaties, after which Irish political leaders organized second votes in another effort to obtain ratification. The paper argues that leaders justified repetition partly through claims about voter incomprehension and warnings about the consequences of another “no.”

Did the European Union force Ireland to vote again?

No. Irish constitutional law, rather than EU law, required referendums for treaties that went beyond the scope of existing agreements. The paper argues that the responses of Irish and EU leaders to the first defeats reveal a broader EU political culture that constrained policy contestation.

Did the Nice and Lisbon treaties change before Ireland’s second votes?

The Nice Treaty itself was not renegotiated; the second referendum wording emphasized Irish military neutrality. Before the second Lisbon vote, guarantees clarified Irish taxation and military policy, but they did not alter the treaty text.

Are repeated referendums inherently undemocratic?

No. The paper says a repeated referendum can be defensible when law requires multiple votes, material new facts emerge, or impartial safeguards govern repetition. The democratic concern arises when governments repeat only the outcomes that frustrate leaders’ preferred policies.

Why did Ireland’s second Nice and Lisbon referendums pass?

The Nice reversal chiefly reflected higher turnout, stronger campaigning, and the mobilization of previously inactive “yes” voters. The Lisbon reversal involved more vote switching amid changed economic conditions, a better-funded “yes” campaign, policy guarantees, and warnings about the consequences of rejection.

How should I cite this paper?

Recommended citation: Jerzak, Connor T. 2014. “The EU’s Democratic Deficit and Repeated Referendums in Ireland.” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 27 (3): 367-388. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10767-014-9185-8.

BibTeX

@article{jerzak2014eu,
  author  = {Jerzak, Connor T.},
  title   = {The EU’s Democratic Deficit and Repeated Referendums in Ireland},
  journal = {International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society},
  year    = {2014},
  volume  = {27},
  number  = {3},
  pages   = {367--388},
  doi     = {10.1007/s10767-014-9185-8},
  url     = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10767-014-9185-8}
}

Download the BibTeX file.

Who wrote this paper?

Connor T. Jerzak is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Government at The University of Texas at Austin. His affiliation at time of article publication was the Department of History at Oberlin College. See his ORCID record or Google Scholar profile for additional research.